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WHAT AFFECTS WE LEVEL CF HONFS!'Y IN AN ECC!OIY? 
Raaj Kumar Sah 
June 1985 
R>te: Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated 
to stinulate discussion and critical cament. References in 
publicatioos to Disrussion Papers should be cleared with the 
author to protect the tentative character of these papers. 
ABSTRACT 
This paper focusses on questions such as what determines the societal 
level of honesty (that is, the proportion of honest individuals in the economy), 
and why some economies may be more honest, or less honest, than others. A 
central feature of our model is that an individual's (Bayesian) behavior 
(to be honest or dishonest) is influenced by his own past experiences which, 
in turn, are determined by the behavior of others. Therefore, honesty en­
courages honesty, whereas dishonesty encourages dishonesty. Our formal 
analysis is conducted within an overlapping generations framework, in which 
individuals live for a finite amount of time, but the society is a going 
concern. 
We show that there can be dishonesty in an economy even if the young­
est generation is entirely honest, and that there can be honesty in an economy 
even if the youngest generation is entirely dishonest. We predict the effects 
(on the level of honesty) of parameters representing the characteristics 
of individuals and the economy. For instance, if the youngest generation 
believes that the level of honesty in the economy is higher then, indeed, 
the actual level of honesty is higher. In addition, we have been able to 
delineate intuitive conditions under which an economy is less honest (or 
more honest) if people live longer, and under which older persons are less 
honest (or more honest) than the younger ones. 
WHAT AFFECTS 1HE LEVEL OF HONESTI IN AN ECONOMY? 
The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, 
But in ourselves, ••• 
Shakespeare 
Raaj Kumar Sah* 
March 1985 
..... 
*Yale University. I thank George Akerlof for a useful discussion. 
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WHAT AFFECTS 1HE LEVEL OF HONES'IY IN AN ECONOMY? 
By Raaj Kumar Sah 
Social scientists have often grappled with questions such as what 
determines the level of honesty in a society, and why one society may be 
1 more honest, or less honest, than another. We present here a model within 
which such questions can be posed, and show that economic insights can be of 
2significant help in ascertaining the answers. 
The aspect of human behavior which plays a central role in our anal­
ysis is that an individual's decision to be honest or dishonest depends, 
in part, on his own past experiences. For instance, if an individual's past 
experiences consist primarily of having been treated dishonestly, then he 
is likely to believe that there is a preponderance of dishonesty in the 
economy. Further, this belief may induce him to behave dishonestly if it 
appears harmful to him to be honest in a seemingly dishonest world. Thus, 
an individual is honest or dishonest in different phases of his life depend­
ing on the experiences which the passage of time brings to him, and depending 
on the relative costs of being honest versus dishonest. 3 
Next, consider the determination of collective honesty. The main 
feature of our model in this regard is that honesty reinforces honesty, 
whereas dishonesty reinforces dishonesty. This is because the beliefs (and 
the behavior)_ of each individual are affected by the behavior of others. 
Alternatively stated, honest persons generate an externality on others by 
making it more desirable for them to be honest. Dishonest peTsons generate 
an opposite externali ty. We study the properties of the equilibrium where 
1 
2 
these two opposing externalities are in balance with one another. 
Our model of individual behavior is consistent with Bayesian optimi­
zation. In addition, it predicts patterns of behavior which have intuitive 
appeal. For instance, an individual changes his behavior (from being honest 
to being dishonest, or vice-versa) only if his last experience was in con­
tradiction with his beliefs. We determine the societal level of honesty 
(that is, the proportion of honest individuals in the economy) within an 
overlapping generations framework, in which each individual Iives for a 
finite amount of time, but the society lasts forever. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Rather than beginning 
with a general model, we first present a simple example in Section I. The 
main reason for presenting this example is that its simpler context makes 
it easier to focus on some of the features of our oodel. Though this example 
is based on a somewhat polar form o.f individuals' behavior, it is consistent 
with rationality under certain circumstances. Section 2 contains the main 
model for predicting individuals' behavior and for determining the level 
of honesty in the economy. Results are presented in Section 3. The last 
section contains concluding remarks. 
I. AN EXAMPLE 
We employ an overlapping generations framework in which an individual 
lives for n periods. n ~ 2, and it is finite. A new generation enters 
the economy in each period, and all generations have the same (large) number 
thof individuals. yk denotes the level of honesty in the k generation 
(that is, the proportion of honest persons among those who have already lived 
for k - 1 periods), and k = 1, ••• , n. Clearly, 1 ~ yk ~ 0 . The 
average level of honesty in the economy is y and 
3 
n 
(1) y = I Y/n . 
k=l 
The proportion of honest persons in the youngest generation is y1 • At 
present, we take y as an exogenous parameter and show, later, that1 
whether an individual begins his life as an honest or a dishonest person 
can be explained in terms of more fundamental characteristics of indivi­
duals.4 
In each period, an individual encounters (trades with) another in­
dividual, and there is an equal probabi 1ity of encountering any one of the 
individuals in the economy. Thus, the probability that an individual en-
counters an honest person is y •5 After each period, every individual 
reconsiders the choice of his behavior, and decides whether to be honest 
or dishonest in the next period. A wide variety of individuals' behavior 
is (endogenously) determined in the next section. At present, we consider 
a specific example in which an initially honest person remains honest as 
long as he has encountered only honest persons; and an initially dishonest 
person always remains dishonest. This behavior reflects 'extreme caution' 
and, clearly, it is somewhat polar. But,.as we shall see later, it is con­
sistent with rational behavior under certain circumstances. 
The level of honesty in the generation (k + 1) is therefore given by 
(2) 
The sum of the above expression from k = 0 to (n - 1) can be rearranged, 
using (1), to yield 
n-1 
(3) f(y) - Y1 2 y k - ny = 0 • 
k=O 
4 
A solution of the above polynomial equation is a steady state equilibrium 
level of honesty in the economy. Substitution of this solution into (2) 
yields the level of honesty in various generations. 6 
If y is a solution of (3), then our interest is in examining its 
properties only if it is stable, and if 1 > y ~ 0. The reason why stability 
is important is this. If the economy starts from an arbitrary disequilib­
rium situation, then it converges only to a stable equilibrium. Alterna~ 
tively, if the economy is at an equilibrium then, after a small shock, it 
returns to this equilibrium only if the equilibrium is stable. In the pre­
sent context, thus, we need not consider an unstable equilibrium. 
The condition for stability is easy to obtain. A solution y of 
(3) is stable if and only if7 
(4) f (y) < 0 ,y 
where the subscripts of f denote the variable with re,::?ect to which a partial 
derivative is being taken. The economic intuition behind the condition (4) 
is as follows. From (3), f(y)/n can be viewed as the difference between 
this period's average honesty in the economy and the last period's average 
honesty. This difference must be zero at an equilibrium. Now, if the 
economy is out of equilibrium, and if the above difference is positive 
(negative), then stability requires that the corresponding difference in 
the next period should be smaller (larger) than that in this period. But, 
this can happen if and only if (4) is satisfied. 
It is instructive to look at some features of the equilibrium. First 
consider the case in which the youngest generation has honest as well as 
dishonest persons, that is, 1 > > 0 • Then (3) shows that f(O) > 0,y1 
and f(l) < 0. Therefore, there must be at least one internal equilibrium 
5 
(that is, the corresponding y is greater than zero but smaller than one), 
which is stable. In the present case, it turns out that this is the only 
8·1·b .stabl e equ1 1 r1um. 
A more important result is obtained in the case in which the young­
9est generation is entirely honest, that is, y = 1 • In this case, it1 
can be shown that if n ~ 4 , then there is a unique stable equilibrium, 
. . . l 10and it is interna. Thus: If individuals live for four or more periods, 
and if the youngest generation is entirely honest,· then there must be some 
dishonesty in the economy. 
This result may appear counterintuitive at first slght because, with 
a completely honest generation entering the economy in each period, one 
would expect that the economy would eventually become entirely honest. To 
see why this is not true, consider a disequilibrium situation in which there 
is a very small nwnber of dishonest persons (say a dozen out of a million) 
in the economy. These dishonest persons, handful though they are, generate 
an externali ty in each period, and make other persons dishonest who, in 
turn, do the same. This process continues until the stable equilibrium, 
entailing some dishonesty in the economy, is attained. 
Furthermore, there is an intuitive reason why the above result holds 
only if individuals' life span is four or more periods. If individuals live 
longer, then even a small number of dishonest persons have a greater poten­
tial for spreading dishonesty. Conversely, if the individuals' life span 
is short, say only two periods, then dishonesty becomes extinct before it 
acquires a permanent base in the economy. 
We now turn to comparative statics analysis. If e denotes an exog­
enous parameter, then it is obvious from (3) and (4) that the sign of dy/de 
is the same as the sign of f 8 • Now, 3£/ay1 > 0 , from (3). We therefore 
6 
obtain the following result which, as we shall see, holds also for the gen­
eral model presented in the next section. 
PROPOSITION 1: The economy-wide level of honesty is lower if the level of 
honesty in the youngest generation is lower. 
The reason for this result is simple. A lower initial honesty has a 
direct effect of reducing the average. In addition, it increases the inci­
dence of those experiences in which individuals encounter dishonest persons. 
The indirect effect, therefore, also leads to a reduction in the economy-wide 
honesty. 
The effect of an increase in the life span of individuals can be as-
certained from (3), which yields f(y, n+l) -f(y, n) = -y(l-y1y 
n-1) < 0. 
Thus, the economy's level of honesty declines if people live longer. This 
is because the individuals' behavior in the present example is such that an 
older generation is less honest and, in fact, the oldest generation is the 
least honest of all generations. A longer life span, therefore, lowers the 
average honesty in the economy, and also creates a negative externality. 
The above comparative statics results are depicted in Figure 1. Note, 
however, that the present result concerning the effect of individual's life 
span is, in part, due to the extreme caution underlying the individuals' 
behavior. This result is modified, and indeed it is less pessimistic, when 
more general forms of behavior are considered, to which we now turn. 
Figure 1 
y is the proportion1 .
The proportion of of honest persons inhonest persons in the youngest generation.the economy, y. 
Yi= 1 
~-------------- y 1 < 1 
2 3 
The life span of individuals, n. 
7 
II • TI-IE MODEL 
We begin with a model of individual behavior which is not only con­
sistent with individual (Bayesian) optimization, but which also predicts. 
appealing behavioral patterns. Individuals begin their lives with differ­
ent beliefs (priors) concerning the extent of honesty in the economy, and 
these differences influence whether an individual begins his life as an 
honest or a dishonest person. Denote these two types of individuals by the 
superscripts i = 1 and 2, respectively. 
An individual revises his beliefs in each period based on his past 
experiences, and chooses his behavior (to be honest or dishonest) depending 
ik on what he considers to be best for himself. m denotes the mean estimate 
of the level of honesty in the economy, which an individual of type i makes 
ikwhen he has lived for k periods. We discuss the determination of m 
below, but before that we look at the choice faced by an individual. 
Individual Choice: The relative cost of being honest versus dishonest 
is determined as follows. In any single period, an honest person receives 
an (expected) utility Ugg if he encounters an honest person, and utility 
Ugb if he encounters a dishonest person. For a dishonest person, the cor­
responding utilities are Ubg and Ubb • We assume Ubb > ugb, and 
Ugg > Ugb. That is, being dishonest is better if one encounters a dishonest 
person, but being honest is better if one encounters an honest person. The 
individual must, however, choose his behavior before the actual encounter. 
It follows than that an individual of type i is honest in the 
period (k + 1) of his life if 
ik
(5) m > U 
. d. h h . lland 1s is onest ot erw1se. In (5), we have defined 
8 
one would expect, U can be viewed as a summary parameter representing the 
relative cost (in terms of utilities) of being honest versus being dis-
12honest. It is this summary parameter which we shall use in the rest of 
the paper. 
Two aspects of the individual's choice should be noted here. First, 
the decision criterion (5) shows that an individual's choice depends on the 
mean of his priors concerning the level of honesty in the economy, but not 
on the distribution of his priors. Second, we have assumed that, in deter­
mining his behavior, an individual believes that his own choice to be honest 
or dishonest does not affect the level of honesty in the economy. This 
assumption is justified in the present context in which the number of in­
dividuals in the economy is large. 
Individual's Beliefs: The total number of honest persons which an 
individual encounters during his k past periods is clearly a binomial dis­
tribution. We assume that the initial priors of an individual (concerning the 
level of honesty in the economy) are distributed according to a beta distri-
bution with parameters i i(u, w) 13• Therefore, a standard result in 
statistics14 allows us to express as 
ik = ui + i (k)(6) m 
ui + wi + k 
where si(k) is the number (score) of honest persons which this individual 
has encountered during the k past periods. By substituting (6) into (5), 
we can express an individual's decision criterion in terms of his initial 
beliefs and his past experiences. 
Now recall that we had defined individuals of type i = 1 and 2 to 
9 
be respectively those who are initially honest and dishonest. From (5), 
10 20this means: m ~u, and m < U • From (6), therefore, the above 
definition can be equivalently expressed as 
1 2 
u u
(7) > u , and < u •1 1 2 2 u + w u + w 
It follows then that is simply the proportion of individuals who havey1 
initial beliefs specified by the first part of expression (7). 
15 
Properties of lndividuals Behavior: The decision criterion (5) can 
be expressed in a much simpler form by defining 
(8) 
as the reservation level for being honest. From (5) and (6), then, an.in­
dividual's decision to be honest or dishonest in the period (k + l) of his 
life is determined by the following decision rule. 
(9) Be honest if si(k) > ci(k) , and be dishonest otherwise. 
An individual thus determines his optimal behavior in each period by simply 
comparing the score of honest persons he has encountered in the past to the 
reservation level for that period. The decision rule is clearly parsimonious 
in the use of memory. 
A useful feature of the above model is that it is capable of generat­
ing a wide variety of individuals' behavior, depending on the parameters 
(u,i w i , U) representing initial beliefs and the relative cost of alterna-
tive behaviors. Furthermore, the model predicts patterns of behavior which 
have attractive properties. Some of these properties are described below; 
particularly those which will be helpful in deriving the results in the next 
section. 
First: An individual changes his behavior (from being honest to dis­
honest, or vice-versa) only if his last experience has contradicted his belief. 
To see this, note that if an individual was honest in the last period, and 
if his last encounter was with an honest person, then he remains honest in 
this period. This is because if si (k - 1) > ci (k - 1) , and if 
i(k) = si(k - 1) + 1 then, from (8), si(k) > ci(k) • A parallel argument 
shows that a person remains dishonest if he was dishonest in the last period 
and if he encountered a dishonest person. Therefore, a necessary condition 
for a change in an individual's behavior is that his last experience should 
be in contradiction with his beliefs. 
Second, it is obvious from (8) that the reservation level is higher 
for an older person, that is 
(10) 
Third, expressions (7) and (8) yield 
2
(11) c (k) > c 1(k) • 
In other words, the reservation level for an initially dishonest person is 
higher, at any stage in his life, than the corresponding reservation level 
for an initially honest person. 
Finally, the effects of exogenous parameters on reservation levels 
can be seen directly from (8). They are 
( 12) and for any k • 
11 
Now, note from (7) that a smaller ui or a larger wi implies a smaller 
miO •16 From (.12), therefore, the reservation level is higher for efther type 
of individual if he initially believes that the level of honesty in the 
economy is lower, or if the relative cost of honesty is higher. All of 
the above properties are clearly in agreement with what we would expect the 
nature of human behavior to be. 
The Level of Honesty in the Economy: The proportion of individuals 
of type i who are honest in the generation (k + 1) is the probability of 
(9) being satisfied. This, in turn, is the probability of ci(k) or more 
successes in k independent Bernoulli trials, where y is the probability 
of success in each trial. To calculate these probabilities, we use Ci (k) 
to denote integer valued reservation score corresponding to (8). Specifically, 
Ci(k) equals ci(k) if the latter is an integer, and Ci(k) equals the 
number which is the closest higher integer to i (k) , otherwise. The 
decision rule (9) now implies that an individual is honest in generation 
(k +l) if si(k) ~ Ci(k) • The corresponding probability can be calculated 
from binomial distribution; we denote this probability as Bi(k) , where
17 
(13) 
Therefore, the proportion of honest individuals in generation (k + 1) 
is 
(14) 
Using (1), the sum of the above expression from k = 1 to (n - 1) can be 
rearranged to yield 
12 
(15) f(y) 
As before, a solution of the above polynomial equation is a steady-state 
equilibrium level of honesty in the economy, and an equilibrium is stable 
if and only if it satisfies (4) •18 Also, the existence of equilibrium can 
be studied by using techniques parallel to those used in Section I. For 
instance, if y is internal, that is 1 > y > 0, then (15) yields:1 1 
f(0) > 0 and f(l) < 0. Therefore, corner equilibria (that is y = 0 
or 1} are not possible, and at least one stable internal equilibrium must 
exist. This, in turn, has an implication which we would intui_tively expect: 
If the youngest generation contains both honest and dishonest persons, then 
the economy can not be entirely honest or entirely dishonest. 
It would be useful here to demonstrate our earlier claim that the 
example in Section I is a special case of the present model. To see this, 
note.that if c1(k) = k , and c2(k) > k , then (13) implies: 
kB1(k) = y , and B2(k) = 0 • Substitution of these into (15) yields the 
special case (3). Further, the above reservation scores can be shown to be 
optimal for many sets of parameters (ui, wi, U) ; particularly those in 
which the relative cost of honesty, U, is high and the initial beliefs 
are such that 'extreme caution' is the rational behavior. 19 
III. RESULTS 
Our objective in this section is to derive some of the important prop­
erties of the level of honesty in the economy. We first examine whether 
there can be dishonesty (honesty) in an economy if the youngest generation 
is entirely honest (dishonest). Clearly, the answer is yes, because, even 
when is zero or one, there would be many different sets of parameters 
13 
for which the equation (15) has an internal stable solution. In Section I, 
we have already provided an example in which y is one, but the equilib­
1 
rium is internal. We now present an example in which y1 is zero, but the 
equilibrium is internal. 
Consider the case in which an initially honest person remains honest 
throughout his life, and an initially dishonest person becomes honest, and 
remains so, if he encounters at least one honest person. That is, the reser-
vation scores are: C2 (k) = 1 • These scores exhibit 
'very little caution' and they can, once again, be shown to be optimal for 
many sets of parameters, particularly those where the relative cost of 
2 · k. l 20honesty, u , 15 ow. From (13), therefore, B (k) = 1 - (1 - y) • Sub-
stituting this into (15) and setting y at zero, it can be verified that:1 
If the youngest generation is entirely dishonest, then the unique stable 
equilibrium entails some honesty in the economy, provided individuals live 
for four or more periods. 21 The reason for this counterintuitive result is 
parallel to the one explained in Section I. 
Obviously, the above example and the one presented earlier in Section 
I are particular illustrations of the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 2: There can be dishonesty in an economy even if the youngest 
generation is entirely honest, and there can be honesty in an economy even 
if the youngest generation is entirely dishonest. 
The level of honesty in the present model depends on the parameters 
(y
1
, u, i wi , U, n) • For comparative statics analysis, recall that the sign 
of dy/de is the same as that of where 9 is an exogenous parameter.fe 
n 1 2 1Now, af/ay = 1 + l [B (k) - B (k)] , from (15). Further, C2(k) > C (k) ,1 k=l 
Bi Cifrom (11), and is decreasing in from (13). Hence, 
14 
2B1(k) ~B (k) , and af/ay1 >0. Clearly, therefore, Proposition 1 holds in 
the present model. The reason for this is simple. An initially dishonest 
person is no more likely to be honest (at any stage in life) than an ini­
tially honest person. A lower level of initial honesty thus not only lowers 
the economy's average, but it may also decrease the level of honesty in the 
older generations. Both of these effects, in turn, have externali ty which 
lowers the level of honesty. 
Next, recall from (12) that the reservation level ci (k) is smaller if 
ui is larger. As a consequence, either Ci(k) remains unchanged, or it 
decreases. Correspondingly, either Bi(k) remains unchanged, or it increases. 
Thus af/aui ~ 0. An exactly parallel argument shows that af/awi < O and 
fu.:: 0. These yield the following result. 
PROPOSITION 3: The level of honesty in the economy is nondecreasing in the 
initial beliefs of individuals concerning the economy's level of honesty, 
and it is nonincreasing in the relative cost of honesty. 
A stronger result is obtained if the reservation score is affected by 
the parameters for either type of individuals in at least one generation. 
In this highly plausible case: A higher (lower) initial prior or a lower 
(higher) relative cost of honesty must raise (lower) the economy's level of 
honesty. The result is quite intuitive. If the youngest generation (of 
either type of individuals) believes that the level of honesty in the econo~y 
is higher then they can not be less honest at any stage in their life. 
Further, if this belief makes them more honest in even one generation (which 
is what we would normally expect) then, clearly, the belief has a direct 
as well as an indirect effect of raising the level of honesty in the econo □y. 
The effect of a higher (or a lower) relative cost of honesty can be understood 
15 
similarly. 
To assess the implications of the individuals' life span, we·use (15) 




PROPOSITION 4: A longer life span of individuals lowers (raises) the level 
of honesty in the economy if 
( 16) 
is negative (positive). 
This proposition has a straightforward meaning. If, at present, the 
level of honesty in the oldest generation is lower (higher) than that in 
the economy, then a longer life span lowers (raises) the economy's level of 
honesty. Whether (16) is negative or positive depends, in turn, on whether 
the reservation scores are high or low. This can be seen by looking at (13). 
If the reservation scores are high then B's are small (closer to zero) and 
( 16) would be negative. On the other hand, if the reservation scores are low, 
then B's are large (closer to one) and the expression (16) would be posi­
tive. Now, recall our earlier discussion of the determinants of the reser­
vation scores. In a qualitative sense, then, an increased life span of in­
dividuals lowers (raises) the level of honesty if the initial priors are 
small (large) and if the relative cost of honesty is large (small). 
We finally delineate the conditions under which an older generation 
is less (or more) honest than its younger generation. This depends directly 
on the sign of Yk+l - yk • Using (14), we obtain the following result. 
16 
PROPOSITION 5: The (k + l) st generation is less (more) honest than the 
kth .generation 1..f 
{17) 
is negative (positive) • 
• The qualitative implication of this proposition is that the effect 
of age on the honesty level of a generation depends solely on whether the 
older generation's reservation scores are higher than or equal to that of the 
succeeding generation. To see this, note from (8) that a unit increase in 
the age increases ci(k) by less than one. As a consequence: either 
Ci (k) = Ci (k - 1) or Ci (k) = Ci (k - 1) + 1 In the former case, 
Bi (k) > Bi (k - 1) because if two successive generations have the same reser­
vation scores, then the older generation must be more honest. In the latter 
case, on the other hand, Bi (k) < Bi (k - 1) because if both the reservation 
score as well as the age increase by one, then the probability of meeting 
22the reservation score is lower. Thus, if the reservation scores of both types 
of individuals increase (remain unchanged) with the passage of a period, 
then they are more (less) dishonest than their younger generation. The 
effect of age on honesty is ambiguous, in general, in the intermediate case 
in which the reservation score increases for one type of person but nor for 
the other type. 
17 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There has been an increasing awareness in the literature of the pos­
sible effects of dishonesty, opportunism and other similar forms of human. 
behavior on the level of economic activity. It is then natural to ask ques­
tions such as what determines the level of honesty in a society, and why 
one society may be less honest, or more honest, than another. In this paper, 
we have presented an economic model within which these questions can be 
posed and analyzed. 
Our model is based on some of the most natural ways of thinking about 
individuals' decisions to be honest versus dishonest, and about the collective 
determination of honesty in society. An individual is honest or dishonest 
in different phases in his life depending, .in part, on his own past experi­
ences (that is, on how much honesty and dishonesty has been done to him in 
the past) • Further, each person's experiences are determined by the behavior 
of others. At the societal level, therefore, honesty encourages honesty, 
whereas dishonesty encourages dishonesty. Our model not only admits these 
ideas, but also allows us to investigate how the societal level of honesty 
is influenced by the characteristics of individuals and the economy. The 
formal model presented in this paper is, of course, not the most general 
model that one can construct but, I believe, it provides a potentially 
fruitful direction for further extensions and concomitant qualifications. 
We have shown that if the youngest generation believes that the level 
of honesty is higher in the society then, indeed, the actual level of honesty 
in the society is higher. But, at the same time, there can be dishonesty 
in the society even if the youngest generation is entirely honest, and there 
can be honesty in the society even if the youngest generation is entirely 
dishonest. In addition, we have delineated intuitive conditions under which 
18 
the society is less honest (or more honest) if people live longer, and under 
which the older persons are less honest (or more honest) than the younger 
ones. 
APPENDIX 1 
Here we show that y is a stable solution to (3) or (15) if and only 
if fy(y) < 0. The proof applies both to the example in Section I, as well 
as to the model in Section II. For the former case, simply substitute: 
B2B1(k) = yk, and = 0. 
Time is denoted by t • At time t, the level of honesty in gen­
eration k is yk(t) , and the economy-wide level of honesty is y(t) • 
If the economy begins with arbitrary numbers for y2(0), ••• , yn(O) , then 
it can be verified that for t > n - 1 
n-1 n-1 
(18) ny(t +l) = y1 + y1 I B
1(k, y(t)) + (l-y1) I B
2(k, y(t)) • 
k=l k=l 
Now, define a fwiction f such that the right hand side of (18) equals 
f(y(t)) + ny(t) • Therefore, the equation of motion is 
(19) y(t + 1) = y(t) + f(y(t))/n 
Clearly, the steady state, y(t + 1) = y(t) , requires that f(y) = 0 • 
This is what we have used in the text. 
The stability properties can be examined in Figure 2. Steady states 
are those points where y(t +l) intersects the 45 degree line. By inspec­
tion, it follows that a steady state is stable (unstable) if y(t + 1) 
intersects the 45 degree line from above (below). Therefore, y is a stable 
steady state for (19) if and only if fy(y) < 0. The same conclusion can 
also be reached by using more sophisticated arguments, for example, those 




y(t + 1) 
y(t) 
Only those steady states are stable 
where y(t + 1) intersects the 45-degree 
line from above. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. I use the word honesty in a generic sense, without distinguishing it 
from other expressions such as trust, guilelessness, truthfulness, 
low opportunism, etc. 
2. The potential consequences of dishonesty have been increasingly studied 
in the economics literature. Oliver Williamson (1985) has succintly 
argued that a higher opportunism increases transaction costs which, in 
turn, victimize many transactions which would have otherwise taken place. 
Thus, the level of economic activity may be reduced. Also, see Kenneth 
Arrow (1974, p. 23) on this issue. The focus of this paper, however, 
is not on the consequences of honesty, but on what determines societal 
honesty. ,_ 
3. This view parallels some aspects of the functional theory of learning. 
See Ernest Hilgrad and Gordon Bower (1966) for a review of this and 
other theories of learning. 
4. We do not, however, go into the ultimate determinants of individuals' 
characteristics. This is in keeping with a standard economic approach 
in which the individuals' characteristics are parametrically specified, 
and their effects on the economy-wide variables are determined. 
5. This involves a slight simplification. If N is the number of persons 
in a generation, then an honest person encounters an honest person with 
a probability (nNy - 1)/ (nN - 1) , and a dishonest person encounters 
an honest person with a probability nNy/ (nN - 1) • But since N is 
large, both of these probabilities are nearly equal to y. Also, we 
assume that N is an even number and, therefore, nN/2 is the number 
of pairs in the economy. 
20 
21 
6. The calculation of the equilibrium level of dishonesty (that is, the 
proportion of dishonest persons in the economy) is straightfOTWard. 
If bk is the level of dishonesty in generation k , then bk= 1 yk 
and the economy-wide level of dishonesty is b = 1 - y. 
7. See Appendix 1. 
8. To see this, note that the polynomial equation (3) has two positive 
solutions because f changes sign twice. Also, fy must be negative 
for one solution, and positive for the other. The latter solution is, 
therefore, unstable. 
9. The case in which the youngest generation is completely honest can not 
be usefully analyzed within the present simple example. We examine 
this case in the next section. 
10. With y = 1 , the expression (3) yields f(O) > 0, f(l) = 0, and1 
fy(l) = n(n - 3)/2 • There are two positive solutions of (3) and, 
clearly, y = 1 is one of them. But if n > 4, then f y (1) > 0 
This means y = 1 is an unstable solution, and also that the other 
solution is internal and stable. 
11. We assume that an individual chooses to be honest if he is indifferent 
between being honest and dishonest. 
:'__ :: 12. this is because U is increasing in (Ubb - Ugb) , and it is decreas­
Also, note that the bounds on U rule out those 
cases in which every type of individual remains either honest or dis­
honest, throughout his life, regardless of his beliefs and past exper-
iences. 
i i13. u and w can take any positive values. 
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14. See DeGroot (1970, p. 160) and Rao (1973, p. 335). 
15. The assumption that individuals can have only two kinds of initial be­
liefs has been made solely for expositional ease. Our qualitative 
results remain unchanged if, instead, a continuum of initial beliefs 
among individuals is posited. 
16. For brevity, the effect of a simultaneous change in ui and wi on the 
reservation level and its consequences, in turn, on the level of honesty 
in the economy is not discussed in this paper. 
17. It is obvious that Bi (k) = 1 if ci (k) < 0 , and Bi (k) = 0 if 
Ci (k) > k • 
18. Clearly, there may be multiple stable equilibria. This should not be 
surprising because a multiplicity of equilibria is a conunon feature of 
problems dealing with economy-wide determinations. Two identical econo­
mies can, therefore, have different levels of honesty. Also, a compari­
son of the honesty levels between two different economies can not always 
be translated into possible differences in their respective char-
acteristics. The number of stable equilibria, however, can not exceed 
n/2 • To see this, note that (15) can not have more than (n - 1) 
solutions,because the highest possible order of the polynomial f is 
(n -1) • Further, by plotting f against y , it can be observed 
that stable and unstable solutions alternate in the present problem. 
Therefore, the number of stable equilibria can not exceed n/2 • 
19. For example, consider the following sets of parameters: U = (on -1)/on , 
u1 = o(o-l)n2 , wl = (o - l)n , and w2 = (u2
 +n)/(on-1) , for any 
0 > 1 , u2 > 0 , and n > 2 . Then (8) yields: k > c1(k) > k - 1 , 
and c
2(k) > k . Therefore, c1(k) = k , and c2(k) > k . 
23 
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20. For instance, consider: U = I/on u = (w + n) / (on - I) , 
u 2 = (c - l)n , and w2 = onu 2 , for any WI > 0 , cS > 1 , and 
n > 2 . Then from (8), c1(k) < 0 , and 1 > c 2 (k) > 0 • Thus, 
C1(k) ~ 0 , and c2(k) = 1 . 
n-1 k 
,21. In this example, (15) yields: f(y) =n(l -y) - I o - y) = 0 
k=O 
f(O) = 0 , f(l) < 0 , and fy(O) = n(n - 3) /2 • Now, if f is viewed 
as a polynomial in (1-y) , then it changes sign twice. Hence, f 
has two solutions for which y < 1 , and y = 0 is one of them. But 
if n > 4, then fy(O) > 0. Thus, y = 0 is an unstable solution 
if n > 4, and the only stable solution is internal. 
22. This and the last assertion follow from the standard properties of bi-
k\.. k-. wherenomial distribution. Define B(C, k, y) = i ( j)YJ (1 - y) J , 
J 
j = C, ••• , k • Then it can be verified that: B(C, k, y) > B(C, k - l, y) , 
and B(C + 1, k, y) < B(C, k - 1, y) • 
REFERENCES 
Arrow, K. J., 1974, The Limits of Organization. Norton, New York. 
DeGroot, M. H., 1970, Optimal Statistical Decisions, McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Hilgrad, E. R. and G. H. Bower, 1966, Theories of Learning, Appleton-Century-
Crofts, New York. 
Rao, C.R., 1973, Linear Statistical Inference and its Applications, John 
Wiley, New York.-
Safanov, M. G., 1980, Stability and Robustness of Multivariate Feedback· 
Systems, The MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Williamson, O. E., 1985, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, forthcoming, 
The Free Press, New York. 
24 
